SECTION I: PHILOSOPHY
The
conceptions of life and the world which we call ‘philosophical’ are a product
of two factors: one, inherited religious and ethical conceptions; the other,
the sort of investigation which may be called ‘scientific’, using this word in
its broadest sense. Individual philosophers have differed widely in regard to
the proportions in which these two factors entered into their systems, but it
is the presence of both, in some degree, that characterizes philosophy.
‘Philosophy’
is a word which has been used in many ways, some wider, some narrower. I
propose to use it in a very wide sense, which I will now try to explain.
Philosophy,
as I shall understand the word, is something intermediate between theology and
science. Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which
definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it
appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or
that of revelation. All definite knowledge—so I should contend—belongs to
science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology.
But between theology and science there is a ‘No man’s Land’, exposed to attack
from both sides; this ‘No man’s Land’ is philosophy. Almost all the questions
of most interest to speculative minds are such as science cannot answer, and
the confident answers of theologians no longer seem so convincing as they did
in former centuries. Is the world divided into mind and matter, and if so, what
is mind and what is matter? Is mind subject to matter, or is it possessed of
independent powers? Has the universe any unity or purpose? Is it evolving
towards some goal? Are there really laws of nature, or do we believe in them
only because of our innate love of order? Is man what he seems to the
astronomer, a tiny lump of carbon and water impotently crawling on a small and
unimportant planet? Or is he what he appears to Hamlet? Is he perhaps both at
once? Is there a way of living that is noble and another that is base, or are
all ways of living merely futile? If there is a way of living that is noble, in
what does it consist, and how shall we achieve it? Must the good be eternal in
order to deserve to be valued, or is it worth seeking even if the universe is
inexorably moving towards death? Is there such a thing as wisdom, or is what
seems such merely the ultimate refinement of folly? To such questions no answer
can be found in the laboratory. Theologies have professed to give answers, all
too definite; but their definiteness causes modern minds to view them with
suspicion. The studying of these questions, if not the answering of them, is
the business of philosophy.
Why, then,
you may ask, waste time on such insoluble problems? To this one may answer as a
historian, or as an individual facing the terror of cosmic loneliness.
The answer
of the historian, in so far as I am capable of giving it, will appear in the
course of this work. Ever since men became capable of free speculation, their
actions in innumerable important respects have depended upon their theories as
to the world and human life, as to what is good and what is evil. This is as
true in the present day as at any former time. To understand an age or a
nation, we must understand its philosophy, and to understand its philosophy we
must ourselves be in some degree philosophers. There is here a reciprocal causation:
the circumstances of men’s lives do much to determine their philosophy, but,
conversely, their philosophy does much to determine their circumstances.
There is
also, however, a more personal answer. Science tells us what we can know, but
what we can know is little, and if we forget how much we cannot know we may
become insensitive to many things of very great importance. Theology, on the
other hand, induces a dogmatic belief that we have knowledge, where in fact we
have ignorance, and by doing so generates a kind of impertinent insolence
towards the universe. Uncertainty, in the presence of vivid hopes and fears, is
painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the support of
comforting fairy tales. It is not good either to forget the questions that
philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves that we have found indubitable
answers to them. To teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being
paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our
age, can still do for those who study it.
1.
The purpose of
philosophy is to:
1.
reduce uncertainty
and chaos.
2.
help us to cope
with uncertainty and ambiguity.
3.
help us to find
explanations for uncertainty.
4.
reduce the terror
of cosmic loneliness.
2.
Based on this
passage what can be concluded about the relation between philosophy and
science?
1.
The two are
antagonistic.
2.
The two are
complementary.
3.
There is no
relation between the two.
4.
Philosophy derives
from science.
3.
From reading the
passage, what can be concluded about the profession of the author? He is most likely not to be a:
1.
historian
2.
philosopher
3.
scientist
4.
theologian
4.
According to the
author, which of the following statements about the nature of the universe must
be definitely true?
1.
The universe has
unity.
2.
The universe has a
purpose.
3.
The universe is
evolving towards a goal.
4.
None of the above.
PASSAGE II
Our propensity to
look out for regularities, and to impose laws upon nature, leads to the
psychological phenomenon of dogmatic thinking or, more generally, dogmatic
behaviour: we expect regularities everywhere and attempt to find them even
where there are none; events which do not yield to these attempts we are
inclined to treat as a kind of ‘background noise’; and we stick to our
expectations even when they are inadequate and we ought to accept defeat. This
dogmatism is to some extent necessary. It is demanded by a situation which can
only be dealt with by forcing our conjectures upon the world. Moreover, this
dogmatism allows us to approach a good theory in stages, by way of approximations:
if we accept defeat too easily, we may prevent ourselves from finding that we
were very nearly right.
It is clear that
this dogmatic attitude, which makes
us stick to our first impressions, is indicative of a strong belief; while a
critical attitude, which is ready to modify its tenets, which admits doubt and
demands tests, is indicative of a weaker belief. Now according to Hume’s
theory, and to the popular theory, the strength of a belief should be a product
of repetition; thus it should always grow with experience, and always be
greater in less primitive persons. But dogmatic thinking, an uncontrolled wish
to impose regularities, a manifest pleasure in rites and in repetition as such,
is characteristic of primitives and children; and increasing experience and
maturity sometimes create an attitude of caution and criticism rather than of
dogmatism.
My logical
criticism of Hume’s psychological theory, and the considerations connected with
it, may seem a little removed from the field of the philosophy of science. But
the distinction between dogmatic and critical thinking, or the dogmatic and the
critical attitude, brings us right back to our central problem. For the
dogmatic attitude is clearly related to the tendency to verify our laws and
schemata by seeking to apply them and to confirm them, even to the point of
neglecting refutations, whereas the critical attitude is one of readiness to
change them—to test them; to refute them; to falsify them, if possible. This
suggests that we may identify the critical attitude with the scientific
attitude, and the dogmatic attitude with the one which we have described as
pseudo-scientific. It further suggests that genetically speaking the
pseudo-scientific attitude is more primitive than, and prior to, the scientific
attitude: that it is a pre-scientific attitude. And this primitivity or
priority also has its logical aspect. For the critical attitude is not so much
opposed to the dogmatic attitude as super-imposed upon it: criticism must be
directed against existing and influential beliefs in need of critical
revision—in other words, dogmatic beliefs. A critical attitude needs for its
raw material, as it were, theories or beliefs which are held more or less
dogmatically.
Thus, science must
begin with myths, and with the criticism of myths; neither with the collection
of observations, nor with the invention of experiments, but with the critical
discussion of myths, and of magical techniques and practices. The scientific
tradition is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two
layers. Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a
critical attitude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but
rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them.
The critical
attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with the aim of
discovering their weak spots so that they may be improved upon, is the attitude
of reasonableness, of rationality. From the point of view here developed, all
laws, all theories, remain essentially tentative, or conjectural, or
hypothetical, even when we feel unable to doubt them any longer. Before a
theory has been refuted we can never know in what way it may have to be
modified.
5. In the context of science, according to the
passage, the interaction of dogmatic
beliefs and critical attitude can
be best described as:
(1)
A duel between two warriors in which one has to die.
(2) The effect of a chisel on a marble stone
while making a sculpture.
(3) The feedshare (natural gas) in fertilizer
industry being transformed into fertilizers.
(4) A predator killing its prey.
(5) The effect of fertilizers on a sapling.
6. According
to the passage, the role of a dogmatic attitude or dogmatic behaviour in the
development of science is
(1) critical and important, as, without it,
initial hypotheses or conjectures can never be made.
(2) positive, as conjectures arising out of our
dogmatic attitude become science.
(3) negative, as it leads to pseudo-science.
(4) neutral, as the development of science is
essentially because of our critical attitude.
(5) inferior to critical attitude, as a critical
attitude leads to the attitude of reasonableness and rationality.
7. Dogmatic behaviour, in this passage, has
been associated with primitives and children. Which of the following best
describes the reason why the author compares primitives with children?
(1)
Primitives are people who are not educated, and hence can be compared
with children, who have not yet been through school.
(2)
Primitives are people who, though not modern, are as innocent as
children.
(3)
Primitives are people without a critical attitude, just as children are.
(4)
Primitives are people in the early stages of human evolution; children
are in the early stages of their lives.
(5)
Primitives are people who are not civilized enough, just as children are
not.
8. Which of the following statements best
supports the argument in the passage that a critical attitude leads to a weaker
belief than a dogmatic one does?
(1) A
critical attitude implies endless questioning, and, therefore, it cannot lead
to strong beliefs.
(2)
A critical attitude, by definition, is centred on an analysis of
anomalies and “noise”.
(3)
A critical attitude leads to questioning everything, and in the process
generates “noise” without any conviction.
(4)
A critical attitude is antithetical to conviction, which is required for
stronger beliefs.
(5)
A critical attitude leads to questioning and to tentative hypotheses.
9. According to the passage, which of the
following statements best describes the difference between science and
pseudo-science?
(1) Scientific theories or hypothesis are
tentatively true whereas pseudo-sciences are always true.
(2)
Scientific laws and theories are permanent and immutable whereas
pseudo-sciences are contingent on the prevalent mode of thinking in a society.
(3)
Science always allows the possibility of rejecting a theory or
hypothesis, whereas pseudo-sciences seek to validate their ideas or theories.
(4)
Science focuses on anomalies and exceptions so that fundamental truths
can be uncovered, whereas pseudo-sciences focus mainly on general truths.
(5)
Science progresses by collection of observations or by experimentation,
whereas pseudo-sciences do not worry about observations and experiments.
PASSAGE III
My aim is to present a conception of justice which
generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of
the social contract. In order to do this we are not to think of the original contract
as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of
government. Rather, the idea is that the principles of justice for the basic
structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the
principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own
interests would accept in an initial position of equality. These principles are
to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social
cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be
established. This way of regarding the principles of justice, I shall call
justice as fairness. Thus, we are to imagine that those who engage in social
cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to
assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social
benefits. Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what
constitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him
to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once and for all what is to count
among them as just and unjust. The choice which rational men would make in this
hypothetical situation of equal liberty determines the principles of justice.
In ‘justice as fairness’, the original position is not
an actual historical state of affairs. It is understood as a purely
hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of
justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows
his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do
not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities.
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures
that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the
outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all
are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his
particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair
agreement or bargain.
Justice as fairness begins with one of the most
general of all choices which persons might make together, namely, with the
choice of the first principles of a conception of justice which is to regulate
all subsequent criticism and reform of institutions. Then, having chosen a
conception of justice, we can suppose that they are to choose a constitution
and a legislature to enact laws, and so on, all in accordance with the
principles of justice initially agreed upon. Our social situation is just if it
is such that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements we would have
contracted into the general system of rules which defines it. Moreover,
assuming that the original position does determine a set of principles, it will
then be true that whenever social institutions satisfy these principles, those
engaged in them can say to one another that they are cooperating on terms to
which they would agree if they were free and equal persons whose relations with
respect to one another were fair. They could all view their arrangements as
meeting the stipulations which they would acknowledge in an initial situation
that embodies widely accepted and reasonable constraints on the choice of
principles. The general recognition of this fact would provide the basis for a
public acceptance of the corresponding principles of justice. No society can,
of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal
sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in
some particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects his
life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness
comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the
principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances
that are fair.
10.
A just society, as conceptualized in the passage, can be best described
as:
(1) A Utopia
in which everyone is equal and no one enjoys any privilege based on their
existing positions and powers.
(2) A
hypothetical society in which people agree upon principles of justice which are
fair.
(3) A society
in which principles of justice are not based on the existing positions and
powers of the individuals.
(4) A society
in which principles of justice are fair to all.
(5) A
hypothetical society in which principles of justice are not based on the existing
positions and powers of the individuals.
11.
The original agreement or original position in the passage has been used
by the author as:
(1) A hypothetical situation conceived to derive
principles of justice which are not influenced by position, status and
condition of individuals in the society.
(2) A hypothetical situation in which every
individual is equal and no individual enjoys any privilege based on the
existing positions and powers.
(3) A
hypothetical situation to ensure fairness of agreements among individuals in
society.
(4) An
imagined situation in which principles of justice would have to be fair.
(5) An imagined situation in which fairness is
the objective of the principles of justice to ensure that no individual enjoys
any privilege based on the existing positions and powers.
12. Which of
the following best illustrates the situation that is equivalent to choosing
‘the principles of justice’ behind a ‘veil of ignorance’?
(1) The principles of justice are chosen by
businessmen, who are marooned on an uninhabited island after a shipwreck, but
have some possibility of returning.
(2) The
principles of justice are chosen by a group of school children whose
capabilities are yet to develop.
(3) The principles of justice are chosen by
businessmen, who are marooned on an uninhabited island after a shipwreck and
have no possibility of returning.
(4) The principles of justice are chosen assuming
that such principles will govern the lives of the rule makers only in their
next birth if the rule makers agree that they will be born again.
(5) The principles of justice are chosen by
potential immigrants who are unaware of the resources necessary to succeed in a
foreign country.
13.
Why, according to the passage, do principles of justice need to be based
on an original agreement?
(1) Social
institutions and laws can be considered fair only if they conform to principles
of justice.
(2) Social
institutions and laws can be fair only if they are consistent with the
principles of justice as initially agreed upon.
(3) Social
institutions and laws need to be fair in order to be just.
(4) Social
institutions and laws evolve fairly only if they are consistent with the
principles of justice as initially agreed upon.
(5) Social
institutions and laws conform to the principles of justice as initially agreed
upon.
14.
Which of the following situations best represents the idea of justice as
fairness, as argued in the passage?
(1) All
individuals are paid equally for the work they do.
(2) Everyone is
assigned some work for his or her livelihood.
(3) All acts of
theft are penalized equally.
(4) All
children are provided free education in similar schools.
(5) All
individuals are provided a fixed sum of money to take care of their health.
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ANSWER KEY
1. (2)
2.
(2) 3.
(4) 4. (4) 5. (2)
6. (1) 7. (4) 8. (5) 9. (3) 10. (3)
11. (1) 12. (4) 13. (2) 14. (4)
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